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Abstract—With the increasing deployment of P2P networks,
supervising the malicious behaviours of participants, which
degrade the quality and performance of the overall delivered
service, is a real challenge. In this paper, we propose a fully
distributed and adaptive revocation mechanism based on the
reputation of the peers. The originality of our approach is that
the revocation is integrated in the core of the P2P protocol and
does not need complex consensus and cryptographic mechanisms,
hardly scalable. The reputation criteria evolve with the contribu-
tion of a peer to the network in order to highlight and help fight
against selfish or malicious behaviours. The preliminary results
show that the user perceived delays are not highly impacted and
that our solution is resistant to reputation and revocation attacks.
Index Terms—P2P networks, revocation mechanism, reputa-
tion mechanism, remote accounts, KAD
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks have proved their ability to
gather and share a large amount of resources thanks to the
collaboration of many individual peers. They are known to
have many advantages compared to the client-server scheme:
P2P networks scale better; the cost of the infrastructure is
distributed and they are fault tolerant.
However, P2P networks encounter several difficulties in-
duced by the growing number of malicious peers. The lack
of central authority and the individual behaviour of the peers
make it difficult for the P2P network to manage them. Ma-
licious peers can be classified in three main categories; the
malicious peer:
• does not follow the P2P protocol and tries to make attacks
• shares malicious content (malware, pollution, illegal con-
tent)
• behaves in a selfish fashion
Several studies have been made to measure the impact of these
bad behaviours on the network. [1] and [8] monitored Gnutella
and highlighted the tragedy of the commons, consequence of
selfish behaviour: 70% of users do not share anything, 50%
of resources are shared by only 1% of users. The authors
warn against the limitation of spontaneous cooperation in
anonymous groups and the possible collapse of such networks
without real control mechanisms. The pollution phenomenon
has also been studied by [12]; it appeared that, on average,
50% of the songs shared on Kazaa are polluted and even more
of the newer files. Thus, malicious behaviours really degrade
the quality of services proposed by public P2P networks.
In this context, P2P networks need a way to have the
behaviour of their users supervised. We propose a fully dis-
tributed and adaptive revocation mechanism. Our architecture
is designed for structured P2P networks which have proved
their ability to be efficient [3] in their organisation and service
offerings. The revocation is decided and adapted according
to the reputation of each peer which is provided by remote
accounts stored in a DHT (Distributed Hash Table). For the
time being, the reputation evolves with the contribution of the
peers to highlight selfish behaviours.
This document is structured as follows. Section II presents
the related works on reputation and revocation within P2P
networks. The foundations of our architecture are described
in Section III which includes the concept of remote accounts
used to store the reputation, the evolution of the reputation and
the revocation mechanism. The revocation is further detailed
and is illustrated in Section IV for the KAD network. Section
V discusses a first performance evaluation and security issues.
Finally, Section VI concludes the document and presents future
works.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Reputation
Reputation management in a distributed environment is very
challenging. The great majority of the reputation systems
has indeed a local view, where each peer stores locally the
reputation of another after having had some relationship with it
[10] [6]. This approach has however several drawbacks. First,
it is impossible to know if a peer is malicious before contacting
it (feedbacks are not shared among the peers). Second, it is
not adapted for large public P2P networks as the probability
to meet a peer several times is so low that the reputation is
inaccurate if it is used. That is why credit systems currently
implemented in applications like eMule1 can not fight against
free riding; the local knowledge is not sufficient to determine
if a peer free rides (few peers are known, few transactions
are established with each one). The advantages are that the
system scales well and it is suited for small communities of
peers interacting frequently.
More recently, the concept of remote accounts presented
in PeerMint [7] can lead to another solution for reputation
management. The idea is the following: each peer has a
public account (i.e. an information set) stored in the P2P
network. The storage of an account is done by mapping it
1Description of eMule credit system: http://www.emule-project.net/home/
perl/help.cgi?l=1&rm=show topic&topic id=134
on a set of peers thanks to the DHT used by structured P2P
networks (Chord, Pastry, Kademlia...). This set of peers is
periodically renewed to keep the information in the network
despite churn; moreover, replication makes the mechanism
more reliable. The remote accounts allow to build a global
reputation management system where the reputation of each
peer is stored in the DHT and accessible to the others.
B. Revocation
Designing a revocation mechanism adapted for P2P net-
works is difficult. The first way to revoke a peer is to build an
access control system. The control cannot be made by a central
authority because it is not adapted in a P2P environment, so
it is the responsibility of the network to enforce control in
a distributed way. In [11] and [14], the authors present and
experiment different approaches to achieve admission control
in a peer group. Several policies are possible: the new peer
must gather the agreement of a fixed number of peers, or a
number proportional to the size of the group. The second
proposal [14] evaluates the performances of cryptographic
mechanisms used to implement the admission control. It
appears that they scale badly and are more suited for ad-hoc
networks with high security requirements than for large public
P2P networks.
In [5] an original way to achieve dynamic revocation in a
P2P network is presented. When a peer detects that another
is malicious, it sends a revocation notification that includes
the malicious peer and itself, considering that its own life is
less important than the goodness of the network. Therefore,
it prevents the revocation mechanism to be hijacked because
the cost to revoke is very high. However, this mechanism has
important limitations. In fact, it can only be used whithin a
private network but not in a public one where each peer has
individual interests.
III. GENERAL ARCHITECTURE
A. Remote Accounts
In our system, we use remote accounts because they are
efficient to introduce reputation in P2P networks. It is a way
to adapt a centralised reputation system (for example eBay)
to a decentralised network. With this system, each user has a
grade evolving with the feedbacks of the others, so that each
knowledge is shared with the community.
Stored in the DHT, each peer’s account has a logical address
which must remain unchanged after each session in addition
to the peer’s address itself. The application eMule already
uses two identities for the peers of the network. The first
called clientID (or KadID) is the 128 bits address of a peer
in the DHT and is randomly chosen at the first connection.
The second is called userID and results from a hash of the
computer. This address is used for the credit system and
public/private keys are associated to it to ensure the identity
of the peer claiming a userID. Our solution links the peer’s
account to the userID as presented in figure 1. In this way,
the userID is not used to localy store the credits of a peer but
provides an entry in the DHT where to store its public account.
Fig. 1. Account storage in the DHT
Conflicting reputation references are avoided by making a
lookup for its own ID before creating the associated account.
An account just contains few data, that is easily storable
even with replication:
• userID (128 bits) : place of the account in the DHT
• publicKey (128 bits) : the account’s owner has the asso-
ciated private key
• trustRating (16 bits) : reputation of the account’s owner
• blackboard (few kiloBytes) : displays the current trans-
actions of the account’s owner
B. Evolution of Reputation
In a file sharing application, the evolution of the reputation
concerns the way a peer contributes to the network, increas-
ing when it uploads data and inversely, decreasing when it
consumes resources. Thus, users are motivated to share data
which are interesting for the community. In parallel, existing
mechanisms ensure that rare data are sent with priority. With
such a reputation rate, identifying free riders becomes easier.
The major difficulty consists in finding a secure way to create
and update the reputation. When a peer joins the network for
the first time, it receives an initial positive reputation allowing
it to start the first transactions. This initial reputation is needed
to initiate transactions inside the network. No initial positive
reputation would result in a global deadlock, like an automaton
without a token.
Next, the evolution must be based on the fact that a
transaction always involves two peers which exchange the
same amount of data in opposite directions. During a trans-
action, both peers have to write the exchange on a part of
their account, we called ”blackboard”. A blackboard’s entry
displays information for each transaction in progress: the
partner in the transaction, the exchange direction, the amount
of data sent or received (periodically updated). At the end of
the transaction, the peers in charge of the accounts have to
update the reputation according to the information displayed
on the blackboards. To prevent a collusion of malicious peers
which could display false transactions in order to increase
their reputation, peers in charge of the accounts can not trust
directly the information sent by the involved peers. They
have to communicate among themselves to check if the same
announcements have been received by the other part to check
the consistency. This condition ensures that the transaction
Fig. 2. Accounts usage during a transaction
is reflected by both peers with the same ratio and avoids the
hijacking of the mechanism. Each bonus of reputation resulting
from a transfer has its opposite. Figure 2 presents the usage
of remote accounts during a transaction and the evolution of
the reputation as a consequence.
In P2P networks, the question of privacy is crucial. The
reputation mechanism does not set up a new menace for the
private life of users. The reputation grade is just a ratio be-
tween downloaded and uploaded data. Considering the grade,
it is not possible to infer the activity of a peer, but only if
the activity is balanced or not. Moreover, it is not possible
to deduce from the blackboard which file is being transferred
because several transactions are needed to retrieve a complete
file.
C. Revocation Mechanism
The revocation mechanism uses the reputation displayed on
the account of each peer to decide if, and how, a peer must be
revoked. The reputation can evolve until a threshold triggering
the revocation. As P2P networks are based on individual peers
serving each other, a way to revoke a peer in a fully distributed
manner is to check whether the requesting peer is worthy of
receiving the service before providing it. If all the peers of the
network check the reputation before providing a service, a peer
with a bad reputation is automatically revoked, its requests
being refused by the network. Moreover, this mechanism is
adaptive because the refused services can change according to
the different criteria of reputation used (contribution, quality
of shared content...). The services provided by a P2P networks
are generic: a bootstrapping process, a publication process
(indexation of the shared files in the network), a search engine,
and direct connections to download and upload data.
The idea of adapted sanctions has been presented by [9].
The authors describe three levels of counter-action according
to the level of free riding detected: decrementing TTL, ig-
noring requests and disconnecting the malicious peer. In our
solution, each service can be checked independently. When a
Revoked Services Sharing Security
bootstrap and routing table No Yes
publication and upload No Yes
download Yes Yes
search No No
TABLE I
RELEVANCY OF THE REVOKED SERVICES ACCORDING TO THE
REPUTATION CRITERIA
Fig. 3. Reputation check during the bootstrapping process
peer only has a bad sharing ratio, it is relevant to remove its
rights to download data but it is not necessary to remove the
other services needed to participate to the network. So, this
peer will be able to download again after having shared more
resources. On the opposite, when a peer is revoked for security
reasons, all its rights must be removed in order to exclude it
entirely from the network (see table I).
IV. DESIGN FOR THE KAD NETWORK
This section explains how and what services can be revoked,
taking example of the KAD network. KAD is a part of the pop-
ular eMule and aMule file-sharing applications. It is based on
the Kademlia protocol [13] and is one of the widest deployed
structured P2P network with millions of simultaneous users.
A. Bootstrapping Process
This phase is necessary to join the network. Concretely, the
bootstrapping peer asks another peer to send it other contacts
from the network to initialise its routing table and inversely, to
be referenced by other peers. As a first step of the revocation
mechanism, the receiving peer will have to check the reputa-
tion of the bootstrapping peer before sending its contacts. This
process is illustrated in figure 3. Unfortunately, a malicious
peer can become a bridge for revoked members by avoiding the
check step. Therefore, controlling the bootstrapping process
allows to quickly carry out some total revocations. Controlling
the other services allows overcoming the previously described
weakness and refining the sanctions.
Fig. 4. Reputation checking during the publication process
B. Other Services
When a peer is connected to the network, services (publi-
cation of contents, search, data download...) are achieved by
sending requests to the other peers. In Kademlia [13] this
is done in two phases. Firstly, Kademlia REQ are sent to
find nodes which are potentially able to deliver the service
(according to their place in the DHT). This phase is general
and only concerns the iteration mechanism used to find several
peers in a part of the P2P network. In the second step, when the
nodes are found, a specific request is sent to ask for a particular
service. The reputation checking must be done before the
specific request for three reasons. Firstly, a peer can be a bridge
and search contacts for other uncontrolled peers. Secondly, the
real services are provided by the specific requests. Controlling
the reputation at this point allows to revoke independently
the different services. Finally, checking the reputation for
Kademlia REQ would increase the overhead for no advantage.
The figure 4 presents the running of a publication request and
includes the reputation checking. The other requests (search,
data download) follow the same scheme.
However, inserting the revocation mechanism into the
search function is not relevant for several reasons. Firstly,
it is not a service through which a peer can damage the
network. Then, searching is useless when the other services
are inactive behind. Finally, it would also introduce overhead
to the network and unnecessary delay for all users.
C. Implementation
We have implemented the revocation mechanism in KAD.
To do that, we have introduced different modifications in the
KAD client:
• our modified client can manage a new kind of information
called ”Account”;
• the associated requests search/store Account were written,
which partially behave like existing requests on key-
words, files or notes;
• new functions were added in the UDPListener, where all
network’s requests are processed. In fact, these functions
do the service-oriented revocation, searching for the rep-
utation and checking it.
Fig. 5. Publication of accounts between modified KAD clients inside a
tolerance zone
• KadID and userID allocation were cheated to control the
place of the peers in the DHT.
We have tested that the reputation storage and retrieval
and the revocation of services work fine on the modified
peers. However, as our implementation defines new data types
and messages to manage the accounts, we can just test our
revocation mechanism on a few peers. Presently, as we test the
mechanism with few resources, we have defined the KadID
and UserID of modified peers to place them in the same
tolerance zone. In this way, we are sure that the accounts
can be stored (figure 5) when using the KAD publication
mechanism. That is enough to verify the mechanism, but
without the real number of replicated peers, performance
measures would be wrong. That is why we are going to scale
up our testbed on EmanicsLab to measure performances and
compare the results with the evaluation presented in section
V.
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Performances Evaluation
The thesis [2] has led a performance evaluation of the KAD
network which allows us to discuss some a priori performance
results. The average delay needed to store information in the
network is about 200 seconds. This time is needed to find ten
peers (for the replication) with a KadID close to the hash of
the information to store. This delay will occur the first time
that a peer connects itself to the network and periodically
later to maintain the account in the network despite the
churn. The delay to retrieve the information fluctuates and
depends on the replication. The more replication there is, the
more robust the stored information is and the quicker it is
retrieved. The information is retrieved linearly, so the more
a peer waits, the more results are returned. A 100 seconds
delay seems to be sufficient to retrieve enough information
to guess the real reputation of a peer. This delay could seem
huge because it appears prior to each service of the network,
except the search as explained. But in fact, 100 seconds to
bootstrap are not penalising, the publication process is entirely
transparent for the user and 100 seconds preceding a download
are insignificant regarding the average waiting time spent in
download queues. These elements show that the resulting
delays would not be sensed by the users; this will be confirmed
by the implementation.
B. Security Issues: Case Study
Security issues are a major constraint when designing
such mechanisms. We have tried to anticipate the possible
malicious behaviours of each actor to make the mechanism
resistant to attacks.
1) Accounting and Reputation Attacks: The first interest of
a malicious peer is to avoid its reputation to decrease when it
downloads, and to increase its reputation more than allowed
when it uploads. To do this, some malicious peers will try
to modify the information displayed on the blackboard at the
end of the transaction. In the first case, the protocol does not
allow to decrease the amount displayed on the blackboard
because this action has no meaning during a transfer. In
the second case, there would be a disagreement between the
two blackboards and the reputation must still be updated
otherwise the mechanism would be easily hijackable. In case
of disagreement, the value which must be used to update
both reputations is the one displayed by the downloading peer
because this value can not be decreased and the downloading
peer has no interest to increase it (its reputation would decrease
more than needed). An agreement can occur between two peers
but only one will gain reputation against the other.
It is also possible that a peer in charge of the account of
another lies when the reputation is requested. This behaviour
does not have a lot of consequences because of the replication.
A reputation’s request will always get several responses. As
the majority of the peers are supposed to be honest, it is simple
to retrieve the right value among the responses using majority
decisions. It also prevents the mechanism from byzantine
failures.
However, the initial reputation could become a problem
if the hash function giving the userID (ie a new account) is
hijackable. In fact, a malicious user could create and use a
new account when its initial reputation is over or transfer
the reputation of the new account to the main via fake
transactions; but a possible solution is described further.
2) Revocation Attacks: The revocation mechanism is robust
because it is fully distributed. If a malicious peer decides to
bypass the protocol, answering to revoked peers or ignoring
good peers’s requests, will have a very limited impact. The
revocation is assured because all the peers of the network
refuse to serve revoked peers; one individual action (whatever
it is) has no consequence for the mechanism.
But there is still a way to hijack the revocation mechanism.
It consists in a coalition of peers placed in the same point of
the DHT, so that they are able to take in charge the majority
of the replicated account of a peer. If an account is replicated
n times, placing such (n/2 +1) peers in this way can make the
entire network revoke the victim peer if the malicious peers
Fig. 6. Probability to take the control over an account in function of number
of malicious peers
lie together. If we consider the following equations:
P (X = i) =
Cix ∗ C
10−i
4000
C104000+x
(1)
P (X > 6) =
i<=10∑
i=6
P (X = i) (2)
The probability (2) is based on the indexation mechanism
of KAD which uses a tolerance zone of 8 bits defining which
peers are able to store an information (on average 4000 peers
for 1 million of unfirewalled users). Let x be the number of
malicious peers in a zone; the probability to take the control
over an account is equivalent to take control on a defined
number of malicious peers until having more than the half
of the total number of requested peers for the replication (by
default 10). The probability to choose i malicious peers among
10 is represented by the hypergeometric law with parameters
(10, x, 4000+x) (1). The attack is successful when at least 6
peers are taken.
The graph 6 shows the probability that the attack be suc-
cessful regarding the number of malicious peers. We can see
that the tolerance zone in which an account is stored (regarding
the ID) is big enough to make a total control difficult without
at least thousands of peers because the storage process is
not entirely deterministic (with a number of controlled peers
greater than 10000 the probability is close to one). Therefore,
if we make the assumption that the possibility to obtain
many KadID is limited (basically one ID per IP address
or computer), this attack becomes very unlikely given the
resources needed.
But the current implementation in KAD is clearly insuf-
ficient and permits to announce up to 216 fake peers in the
same zone [17]. However, several propositions have been
investigated to limit the Sybil attack. In [17], the authors
propose a central authority (CA) delivering KadIDs by cell
phone. The KadID is encrypted by the CA private key from
an IP address and an expiration time and can be decrypted
by any peer with the CA public key to check the validity
of a KadID. Castro et al. [4] presented another design of
trusted certification authorities to secure peer joining. We can
also consider with interest the project Keypeer [18] which
develops a certificate authority delivering keys over a DHT.
Finally, KadID and userID allocation can be linked. When
KadIDs are distributed by an authority (either centralized or
distributed) but not chosen by the client, the hijacking of
userIDs (to retrieve reputation) is also resolved. In fact, with
a stronger KadID, the userID can be derivated from it by a
public function instead of being calculated separately.
It is also possible to detect the peers participating in an
Eclipse attack and to revoke them to stop it. The detection
has been investigated by [15] and [16]. They observe via
anonymous auditing the bounding degree of a node to check
if it is involved in the attack or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supervising the behaviours of the malicious users is the
key for the good development of public P2P networks. Re-
garding the weakness of the currently implemented incentive
mechanisms and the consequences of malicious and selfish
behaviours on the networks, it is important to make the be-
haviours of the peers suit with the P2P philosophy. To answer
to this major problem, we have proposed a revocation mech-
anism which is fully distributed, adaptive, and which does
not require distributed consensus or complex cryptographic
mechanisms. The revocation is not a layer above the network
but is inserted in the core of the protocol, supervising the
services provided by the P2P network. The reputation needed
to take decisions is provided by remote accounts based on the
DHT used by structured P2P networks. For the time being,
the evolution of the reputation concerns the way the peers
contribute to the network (regarding the bandwidth usage)
to fight against the tragedy of the common problem. Each
transaction between two peers is temporarily displayed on
their blackboard to prove the evolution of the reputation. First
analysis show that the resulting delays should not be sensed
by the users. Moreover, the case study done to inventory the
attacks tends to prove that the system itself is robust, as long
as the allocation of a peer’s ID is secured.
The future works consist in scaling up our testbed to
evaluate the performances of the mechanisms implemented on
KAD, particularly concerning the delays and the overhead. In
a next step, we will develop the reputation mechanism to take
into consideration new criteria such as the quality of the shared
content to fight against pollution and malware diffusion, or to
detect and revoke peers participating in a Sybil attack.
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